first came to prominence at the age of twenty-five, with his appointment as the Lucasian professor of mathematics at Cambridge University (1669). His breakthroughs on the calculus, the inversesquare law of gravitational attraction, and the heterogeneity of white light came even earlier, in his anni mirabiles of 1664-66 (see Westfall 1980, chap. 5) . These methods and ideas crystallized into his two major tomes, Principia Mathematica (1687) and the Opticks (1704). External recognition came with his election as a member of Parliament (1689), his knighthood (1701), and his appointment first as warden (1696) and then as master of the Mint (1699), and as president of the Royal Society (1703). But perhaps the greatest honor was being the first nonroyal to be buried in Westminster Abbey, with much of the pomp and circumstance befitting a king. Inspired by the occasion, Voltaire carried the torch of Newtonianism over to France. His Éléments de la philosophie de Newton (1738) and the translation into French of Newton's Principia (1747) by his partner Emilie du Chatelet, coupled with a number of empirical discoveries, did much to insure that Newtonian philosophy became the reigning doctrine by the mid-1750s, putting the Cartesian and Leibnizian alternatives a distant second.
Newton's Principia has traditionally marked the close of the so-called Scientific Revolution, a rubric that is remarkably enduring and robust among historians. Commencing with the work of Herbert Butterfield ([1949 ] 1975 ) and A. Rupert Hall ([1954 1962), the Scientific Revolution has been revived recently, legitimized by several book titles (see Cohen 1994a , 1994b , Jardine 1999 , Lindberg and Westman 1990 , Porter and Teich 1992 , and Shapin 1996 . Of course, there are some skeptics, those who emphasize the continuity with the past or the lack of coherence among the leading instigators. Some of the scholars who have championed this view are John Schuster (1990 ), Catherine Wilson (1995 , and one of the most radical historians active today, Steven Shapin (1996) , notwithstanding his use of the term in the book's title. And in our own volume, there are those who downplay the influence of the Scientific Revolution on economic thinking, and others who deem it of central importance.
Following the publication of Nicholas Copernicus's On the Revolutions (1543), natural philosophers embraced new theories, new methods, and a new metaphysics. The heliocentric system also mandated a new physics, one that is compatible with a moving earth, hence the formulation of the principle of inertia, which became codified as Newton's first law. The new physics called for new branches of mathematics, hence the formulation of analytical geometry by René Descartes, probability theory by Blaise Pascal, Pierre de Fermat, and Christian Huygens, and the differential calculus by Gottfried Leibniz and Newton. New experimental traditions also emerged in the seventeenth century. Most notable in this respect were Galileo, Pascal, Robert Boyle, and Newton, whose findings served to confirm many of the new laws of mechanics, optics, and astronomy. Physiology also was transformed, by Andreas Vesalius, William Harvey, and Hermann Boerhaave most notably. Even natural history shed its ties to Aristotle and Pliny, culminating with the new systems of Carl Linnaeus and Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon. Also significant were the formation of scientific academies and journals, official state support for astronomers and cartographers, and an expansion of scientific teaching in the universities beyond the traditional subjects of mathematics and medicine. But perhaps the most sweeping change of all was the advent of Cartesian dualism, which fostered the mechanical philosophy and the belief that nature was inherently mathematical. The Scientific Revolution, as has been proclaimed so often, swept aside once and for all the commonsense and directly accessible world of Aristotle for one that forevermore would be grasped indirectly, by convoluted acts of reasoning and experimentation.
The Scientific Revolution endures, despite its fuzzy temporal and spatial borders, and despite the fact that it was a prolonged transformation, stretching over more than a hundred years. Granting its efficacy, there are even stronger historical claims to be made; for example, that the political revolutions in Britain (1688), America (1776), and France (1789) are mere progeny of the Scientific Revolution. Less tenuously, the Scientific Revolution was itself partly a product of the economic and technological transformations that Europe experienced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The rise of a merchant class and breakdown of feudalism, the advent of the printing press and assimilation of perspective in the visual arts, the development of new techniques in metallurgy and the manufacture of glass, have all found their exponents as the key that opened the way for the new science. In that respect, the ideas that were forged in the natural and moral sciences fed directly on the same cultural sources, although arguably the emergence and development of modern capitalism and global networks of trade had a more profound influence on the actual content of economic writings. To see this, one could engage the following counterfactual. It would be unthinkable for classical and neoclassical economics to have the content that they have without the advent of capitalism, whereas one might entertain the evolution of modern natural science more or less as we know it in a world as economically abundant but without the capitalist system. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence to suggest that the natural science we have owed a great deal to the rise of the European capitalist economy and that, as a result, the factors governing the development of economic thinking of the time shared a great deal with the factors governing natural science.
Not only did early modern science and economics derive from the same cultural and material setting, but there are also many indications of symbiosis: the new scientific findings and methods of the early modern period seeped over into economic discourse, and vice versa. Indeed, there was a double seepage, as much or more between political economy and physiology, or botanical oeconomy, public benessere, or mineral riches, as between political economy and rational mechanics. The essays contained in this volume provide much material to buttress these more general historical claims. There are some already well-established links, such as Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith, who explicitly applied the methods of the new science to political economy. There are dozens more, however, who either implicitly or explicitly wedded economic ideas with those in natural philosophy, conceptually or methodologically. Some names that figure prominently in one or more of the following essays are Pierre de Boisguilbert, Jacob Bernoulli, Pietro Verri, George Berkeley, Carl Linnaeus, François Quesnay, Marquis de Condorcet, and Thomas Reid.
Oeconomies is a bit of an eyepopper. However, it serves as a constant reminder that economic thinking of the early modern period was significantly different from what came after. Yet it is also far more than just an account of the management of households, as found in Xenophon's Oikonomikos or Aristotle's Politics (see Booth 1993). Just as there were Aristotelian vestiges in the writings of early modern natural philosophers, so, too, economic texts reflect the Aristotelian notion of the oeconomy right up until the end of the eighteenth century. As Ann Firth (1998, 21) has observed, "central to the notion of householding is stewardship, with its connotations of fostering and increasing available resources." Even as late as 1767, we find in James Steuart's Principles of Political Oeconomy the depiction of the sovereign as steward of one nation-sized household. But the term oeconomy was in common use from at least the sixteenth century and applied to a variety of contexts. By the seventeenth century it had been extended to all of God's domain, with God as the supreme manager of nature's larder. The term oeconomy of nature was most likely coined by Kennelm Digby in 1658 and circulated widely, most notably in the work of Linnaeus, Charles Lyell, and Charles Darwin, until Ernst Haeckel declared in 1866 that oecologie would serve in its place (see Worster 1977, 37, 192; and Schabas 1990) . Other assorted applications were the animal oeconomy, the body oeconomy, and even the oeconomy of love (see Spary 1996) .
There is thus a deeper tension to be found in economic theories of the period, with strong allegiances to Greek notions of wealth, social hierarchy, and virtue ethics. But in other respects, economic thinking had weaned itself of its Aristotelian roots far more than had natural science at the time, and it already more closely resembled its modern guise insofar as it was predominantly secular and more or less emancipated from some of the metaphysical debates that beset Cartesian physics. Economics seems to have bypassed the debates on occasionalism, for example, or the problems of causation in general that run right through eighteenthcentury natural philosophy. It was worldly philosophy in the true sense of the term, grounded in debates about currency, trade, and economic growth. If metaphysics played a part, it was in the work of John Locke, who seemed so keenly enamored with the intrinsic value and efficacy of gold (see Appleby 1978) .
As Michel Foucault (1966) observed, and as Keith Tribe (1978) has argued more forcefully, the concept of an economy is a relatively new one, commencing in the early 1800s with David Ricardo most saliently. At best one can point to a rich discourse on economic phenomenamoney, trade, population, prices, and so forth-that was primarily wedded to agricultural production. While these claims have been challenged-Samuel Hollander (1976) , for one, sees Adam Smith's economics as an integrated account of an economy-it would not be misleading to view most contributions to economic discourse of the early modern period as piecemeal rather than synthetic. Even wealth, as readers will observe in many of the essays here, was conceived of as a natural property, coextensive with animal, mineral, and plant. It is not surprising, then, that the treatment of many economic phenomena borrowed imagery and methods from natural philosophy, as the one available discourse to make sense of such properties. In short, the economy was not a detached and self-regulating entity, at least to the degree it became, and hence economic concepts were also developed hand in hand with those in natural philosophy. Whether one takes note of Boisguilbert's appreciation for Gassendian atomism, Verri's and Antonio Genovesi's assimilation of Galilean and Newtonian methods, or Smith's respect for Joseph Black's chemistry, there are unmistakable links between the two fields. We do not wish to urge the view, however, that there was but one subject at the time. Natural philosophy and its separate branches, optics, astronomy, physics, botany, and zoology, had distinct and separate identities that reach right back to Aristotle's treatises. Political economy can also trace its roots in Aristotle's texts, notably the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics, although the term was only coined in the early 1600s, with Antoine de Montchrétien's Traité de l'oeconomie politique ([1615] 1939) . It had acquired a relatively distinct identity and coherence by the middle of the seventeenth century, when several schools of thought had taken form: the Salamanca school, cameralism, mercantilism, Colbertism, and political arithmetic (see Hutchison 1988) . By the early Enlightenment, Locke, William Petty, and David Hume launched a more liberal doctrine that reached a fuller identity with Adam Smith and the so-called classical school of political economy. And Quesnay and his associates gave birth to the school of physiocracy, complete with periodicals. There were thus multiple traditions or discourses at the time, much as debates in natural science were beset with different and conflicting traditions: Leibnizian, Cartesian, and Newtonian. It is helpful to keep this in mind as one proceeds through the volume. Some of the articles serve to forge coherent traditions, and others seem positively centrifugal.
What is most striking is that so many of the contributors to political economy in the period were also engaged in natural philosophy. Some of the names that stand out are William Petty, John Locke, Carl Linnaeus, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, François Quesnay, Antoine Lavoisier, and A. R. J. Turgot, but under closer scrutiny one would be hard-pressed to find a writer on political economy who did not at some point issue a paper on metaphysics or epistemology, if not address a specific branch of scientific inquiry. Indeed, an obvious instantiation is Newton himself, who issued several papers on the currency crisis of his day. Another is JeanJacques Rousseau, who wrote on botany as well as economic inequality. Yet another is David Hume, whose essays on political economy were complemented by his monumental Treatise of Human Nature.
One of the factors that have helped bring this volume into being is the growing appreciation among historians of science of the political and economic context that shaped scientific theories. The first bit of ground was dug long ago, by the Marxist historians Boris Hessen ([1931] 1971) and John Desmond Bernal ([1954] 1965) . But the Cold War muffled their efforts until, in the wake of its thaw, several books of a non-Marxist persuasion appeared, notably Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985) , Mario Biagoli, Galileo, Courtier (1993) , and Steven Shapin's A Social History of Truth (1994) . The strict internalist accounts of science, once offered by E. J. Dijksterhuis ([1950 Dijksterhuis ([ ] 1986 and Alexandre Koyré (1965) , are no longer in vogue. Similarly, a focus on quantification in science, and its links to evolving concepts of objectivity, has helped to bring historians of science to look at political arithmetic and economics more generally (see Rusnock 2002) . From a different angle, there are also some recent studies that show the extent to which early modern science played a role in the economic and technological development of Western Europe, a view that had once been considerably soft-pedaled. 1 The literature that looks at early modern intersections of economics and natural science is modest in size but nonetheless very good (see Schabas 2002) . Probably word for word, no one has yet surpassed Joseph Schumpeter's magisterial account (1954) , which, for all its distortions of the historical record, draws extensive and incisive links between economics and natural science. Some preliminary efforts at concrete studies by historians of science are Vernard Foley (1976) , Peter Buck (1982) , and Charles Gillispie (1980) . Over the past twenty or so years, the literature has grown substantially, thanks in part to the efforts of some of the contributors of this volume. Some monographs (listed alphabetically) that marry early modern science and economics are by Lorraine Daston (1988) , Richard Drayton (2000) , Joel Kaye (1998 ), Judy Klein (1997 ), Lisbet Koerner (1999 ), Jean-Pierre Poirier (1993 , Deborah Redman (1997), Jessica Riskin (2002) , Andrea Rusnock (2002), and Pamela Smith (1994) . Two recent edited collections that bear directly on this subject are Groenewegen 2001 and Smith and Findlen 2002 . Finally, articles by Ken Alder (1995 ), Paul Christensen (1989 , I. Bernard Cohen (1994a ), Judith Grabiner (1998 ), Myles Jackson (1994 , Margaret Schabas (2001) , Simon Schaffer (1989) , and E. C. Spary (1996) , among others, have also deepened our understanding of this theme. In sum, efforts to chronicle and account for the natural-science component of economic thinking in early modern Europe have intensified considerably.
In fact, most of the essays in this volume are directed at extending our understanding of nature and its role in economic accounts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Historians of economics are familiar with nature mainly through the intersection of two traditions: (1) the developmental tradition in which surplus appears as a precondition for escaping "stationarity," prefigured in parts of Smith, and (2) the specifically physiocratic, with its insistence that agriculture is the sole source of surplus. It is now becoming steadily clearer that concern with nature in the age of Newton extended far beyond just tax reform and freedom for the grain trade. Natural resources viewed as a component of wealth required their mapping (Cooper, this volume), although German efforts in this direction independently emulated earlier pioneering attempts by Petty. Emerging perceptions that agriculture sustained all parts of society required that attention be given to husbandry and to productivity in particular (Christensen, this volume; Lowry, this volume) . Meanwhile, a growing awareness of exotic plants, some with important medicinal or other capacities, raised new questions about proprietorship, the natural boundaries of stewardship, and the relation between trade and "domestic" production; it even posed afresh the issue of necessity versus luxury (Spary, this volume) . Nature could take on mystical overtones, as with Linnaeus (Rausing, this volume). It could also become a subject for abstraction-making and modeling, even system-building. Among the abstractions were balance (Riskin, this volume) and value (Müller-Wille, this volume) . The process by which (temporary) stable meanings for these concepts were reached is of course part of the history of political economy, but the essays in this volume remind us that there was a veritable clamor of opinion out of which the now familiar meanings emerged. These, moreover, have been colored by that passage.
It may be helpful to spell out an example. Linnaeus's understanding of botanical exchange clearly turned on the fact that the tradables comprised "unlikes"-seeds of different sorts: differing genera and newness status. Hence values or prices here were a matter of judgment by those well qualified to assess what was novel and important, namely, "consummate botanists." Such exchanges were limited to specific items and particular pairs of individuals, and they were bound to the conditions prevailing at single moments in time. The prices generated are comparable to those in markets for new goods, rather than those applying in old trades, to use Smith's broad classification. So a place exists for Linnaean exchanges in Smith's discussion of pricing, only Smith had almost nothing to say about particular market prices, concentrating rather on generic exchange and the process whereby market prices settle at their average or ordinary level. The reasons why Smith focused on generic exchange rather than on market prices are also the reasons why Linnaean exchange finds no place in modern economic ideas about value. But within the Smithian choice is a decision to move away from talk of value in specific uses and toward cost-based talk (almost) exclusively. Linnaean exchange thus reminds us of a road not taken in political economy and economics, and to encounter it is to understand anew both the judgments implicit in the choice and their further analytical implications.
But to return to the modern recovery of nature, historians of science also remind us that natural and moral concerns in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were separated by very permeable boundaries. The metaphorical traffic, as well as real or supposed influences, operated in both directions. A notion of stewardship perhaps motivated the new agronomy (Christensen, this volume) , whereas the physiocratic notion of wealth is best captured by the metaphor of organic balance-seeking processes (Riskin, this volume). Smith's notion of sympathy called upon William Cullen's neurology (Forget, this volume; Schabas, this volume), but for Robert Whytt and Thomas Reid it was the sentient principle that activated bodily functions via the nerves (Maas, this volume), and it was after all the imagination that led to monetary "madness" (Caffentzis, this volume). Moreover, as Edith Dudley Sylla (this volume) shows, socalled mathematical probability did not originate in mathematics as such or with the frequentist notion of probability. Instead, the thinking was that embodied in business contracts, and in particular in problems such as the terms on which a place in a game (venture) with time still to run could be fairly purchased.
Not all the subjects treated by the contributors here can be positioned in terms of direct and contemporaneous borrowings, or metaphors and abstractions passing across the boundaries separating the natural and the moral. But the natural is never far away, if at times perceived in more obscure ways than even eighteenth-century investigators typically allowed. Thus, and at the very least, alchemical dreams of solving the problems of limited gold stocks for the coinage at one fell swoop supplied the model for thinking about alternatives, among them a paper currency, in late-seventeenth-century England (Wennerlind, this volume). In the case of "sympathy," while it is true that physiological and social investigations in the eighteenth century shared a lot of understandings concerning sympathetic interactions, these also had common roots in an older, more occult tradition according to which universal sympathies (attractions) and antipathies connected all entities (Forget, this volume). On the other hand, there is in this collection an instance of natural philosophy serving as workshop for the modern reshaping of ancient and scholastic notions. The notions were those of public felicity and economia civile, refracted through Galilean and Newtonian prisms to form an original political economy of "moral Newtonian" caste, in eighteenth-century Milan and Naples (Porta and Bruni, this volume). All in all, many rich and detailed accounts of economic phenomena and relations await the attentive reader.
